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Browning: Duration of Lien of Mortgage
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The Montana Court has not considered these objections to
its standard as laid down by the Peel, Keerl, and Narich cases.
If the conclusions of this comment are accepted it would seem
that the law governing the proper instructions on insanity in
Montana might well be clarified by a fuller examination of the
question with a more precise statement from the Court as to
how it intends that these essentially inconsistent doctrines be
reconciled in the law, on the one hand, or with the explicit selection of the one or the other as controlling all such instructions, on the other.
Walter P. Coombs.

DURATION OF LIEN OF MORTGAGE
The problem of the duration of the lien of a mortgage under M. R. C., 1921, Sec. 8267, and under that section as amended
in 1933, has long been a perplexing one to lawyers practicing in
Montana. Cases decided prior to 1939 applied and construed the
statute as it existed before the 1933 amendment. The pertinent
portion of the statute read:
"Every mortgage of real property, made, acknowledged
and recorded as provided by the laws of this State, is thereupon good and valid as against the creditors of the mortgagor or owner of the land mortgaged, or subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers, from the time it is so recorded
until eight years after the maturity of the entire debt or
obligation secured thereby and no longer unless the mortgagee . . . within sixty days after the expiration of said
file an affidavit setting forth [stated
eight years, ...

facts]."'
The first case construing Sec. 8267 was Morrison v. Farmers' & Traders State Bank, et al. In it the Court reached the
conclusion that M. R. C., 1921, Sec. 8243, which provided in
effect that the lien of a mortgage was good as long as the debt
was enforceable, had been amended by Sec. 1, Ch. 27, L. 1913,
is to determine whether the defendant knew the difference between
right and wrong? Is the conflict as to whether "irresistible impulseis a defense, a further example of difference of opinion among the
Courts as to the meaning of "criminal intent"? See 8upra, note 12.
'A mortgage may be extended under the provisions of R.C.M., 1935,
Sec. 8264, which reads, "A mortgage of real property can be created,
renewed, or extended, only by writing, with the formalities required
in the case of a grant of real property". This section deals with an
agreement by the mortgagor and mortgagee, while under Sec. 8267 the
affidavit of renewal is filed by the mortgagee alone.
270 Mont. 146, 225 Pac. 123 (1924). Berkin v. Healy, 52 Mont. 398, 158
Pac. 1020 (1916), held that the statute could not apply to the facts in
that case.
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NOTE AND COMMENT
which appeared unchanged in M. R. C., 1921, as Sec. 8267, and
that, although the debt remained alive, the lien of the mortgage,
as against a subsequent purchaser who took with knowledge,
ceased to exist at the expiration of the period provided for in
the statute, when an affidavit of renewal had not been filed in
accordance therewith. The Court treated the statute as in effect
a statute of limitations and used broad language indicating that
the same result would have been reached even if the original
mortgagor had been still the owner.
The Montana Court in subsequent decisions first limited the
broad statements in the Morrison case,' then ruled contrary to
it without mentioning the Morrison case,' and finally awoke to
the fact that the Morrison case had been in effect overruled by
the earlier case.'
The weight of authority in this country now seems to be that
provisions for renewal of the mortgage by filing affidavit or
other specified methods do not apply to the original parties to
the mortgage, but relate to the effect of the record as giving notice to third persons and to the enforcement of the mortgage lien
as against such third persons.
Sec. 8267 was amended by Sec. 1, Ch. 104, L. 1933, and in
place of the words, "is thereupon good and valid as against the
creditors of the mortgagor or owner of the land mortgaged, or
subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers," there was substituted, "is thereupon good and valid as against all."
The effect of the 1933 amendment has not yet been directly
determined by the Montana Supreme Court. The Court has,
though, suggested that the amendment has resulted in making
Sec. 8267 an absolute statute of limitations. In Reed v. Richardson," the Court, following Skillen v. Harr-is and Turner v.
Powell," held that one who took by virtue of the foreclosure of a

second mortgage and a quit-claim deed and who failed to set up
the general statute of limitations could derive no advantage
from the first mortgagee's failure to file an affidavit of renewal.
But, at the same time, the court indicated that a different result
'The Court held that as to the mortgagor the lien of the mortgage existed as long as the debt was enforceable even though the period specified in Sec. 8267 expired without filing an affidavit of renewal. Skillen v. Harris, et. aL., 85 Mont. 73, 277 Pac. 803 (1929).
'As to a purchaser of the mortgaged property who assumed the mortgage, filing of the affidavit of renewal was unnecessary if the debt
was still alive. Turner v. Powell, 85 Mont. 241, 278 Pac. 512 (1929).
'Reed v. Richardson, 94 Mont. 34, 20 P. (2d) 1054 (1933).
"Wasson v. Beekman, 188 Ark. S95, 68 S.W. (2d) 93 (1934), T. A. Hill
State Bank v. Schindler, 33 S.W. (2d) 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), Head v.
Oldham Bank & Trust Co., 249 Ky. 292, 60 S. W. (2d) 624 (19.3). In
re Glen, 2 F. Supp. 579 (W. D., S. Car. 1932), Cullen v. Reed, 220 Fed.
356 (1915), the holding (if which, with respect to Sec. 8267, the Morrison case refused to follow. See also, 17 NEB. L. B. 139 (1938).
'94 Mont. 34, 20 P. (2d) 1054 (1933).
"See footnotes 3 and 4, supra.
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might have been reached if Sec. 8267, as amended, had governed,
when it noted:
"It is pertinent to observe that at the recent session
of the legislative assembly the section (8267) was amended. Many of the points involved in this case and in other
cases mentioned will not be troublesome in the future."
The amendment has not, however, put an end to litigation
over Sec. 8267. The statute as amended was discussed in the
recent case of Siuru v. Sell. In this case plaintiff had mortgaged
land to defendant and, while the mortgage debt had never been
paid, defendant mortgagee had failed to file an affidavit of renewal within the statutory period. In a foreclosure suit the
District Court found that the debt was still alive, gave the mortgagee a judgment for the amount of the debt, but determined
that under Sec. 8267, as amended, the lien of the mortgage was
gone by reason of the mortgagee 's failure to file the renewal affidavit. Shortly before judgment was entered the mortgagor
filed a declaration of homestead on the property. The mortgagee did not appeal from the determination that the mortgage
was barred, but instead proceeded under the judgment and
sought to levy execution on the same property. The mortgagor
then brought suit to enjoin the sale of this property on the
ground that it was his homestead. From a judgment granting
the injunction, the mortgagee appealed to the Supreme Court.
The existence or non-existence of the mortgage lien was not in
issue in this proceeding since it had already been conclusively
determined. The Court, proceeding on the basis that the lien of
the mortgage was gone, held that the mortgagor's declaration of
homestead was effective against levy of execution under the
judgment obtained on the mortgage debt.
Because of the language in Reed v. Richardson, previously
quoted, and the breadth of the phrase "as against all" in the
amended section, it seems fairly safe to predict that if a case
comes before the Supreme Court requiring a decision, the Court
will hold that the lien of a recorded mortgage expires at the end
of the statutory period, even as against the mortgagor, unless an
affidavit of renewal is filed.
Such a result would be in conformity to that reached under
recent statutes in other States on the subject. These statutes
provide that the mortgage lien is to be absolutely barred after a
specified period of years from the maturity of the principal obligation, unless within a stated time an extension agreement is
placed on record."
' 10S Mont. 438, 91 P. (2d) 411 (1939).
"IDAHO

CODE ANN.

(1932),

44-1102, 1103; ILL. REV.

Moore) 1935, C. 83, Sec. 11a; MASON'S
See also, 49 HARv. L. REv. 643 (1936).

MIN.

STATS.
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NOTE AND COMMENT
Such legislation has been given new impetus by the proposed Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act. Section 12(1) of that
act is modeled after Sec. 9188, MASON'S MINN.

STATS.,

1927, and

reads as follows:
"At the expiration of a period of (fifteen) years from
the last definite date of maturity of the debt or other obligation secured by a mortgage as stated therein, or in an
extension thereof duly executed and recorded as herein
provided, and if no definite date for any maturity be stated therein, then at the expiration of a like period from the
date of the mortgage or of the extension, the lien of the
mortgage shall cease and no suit or proceedings shall be
begun thereafter to foreclose the mortgage."'
It is however, to be noted that even though the effect of the
1933 amendment be taken as a legislative attempt to conform
to these recent statutes, Sec. 8267 is not a satisfactory substitute
for Sec. 12 of the proposed Uniform Real Estate Mortgage.Act.
It leaves many problems in its wake.
Sec. 8267, even in its present form, applies only to recorded
mortgages." The question of the duration of the lien of an unrecorded mortgage under the present statutes will undoubtedly
be troublesome in the future. Sec. 8243 is still on the statute
books and provides in effect that the lien of a mortgage is good
as long as the debt is enforceable. Sec. 8243 was amended by
Sec. 8267 only in so far as recorded mortgages are concerned."
Sec. 8243 would then seem to be controlling in the case of an unrecorded mortgage and the lien of the mortgage would appear to
continue as long as the debt is enforceable. Under the present
statutes, then, and in the absence of judicial legislation, the lien
of an unrecorded mortgage would under some circumstances
exist much longer than that of a recorded mortgage. A recorded mortgage secured by a note which matures in two years will,
unless an affidavit of renewal is filed, no longer be a lien after
ten years and, even if the affidavit is filed, the mortgage lien
will not continue for more than a total of eighteen years."' On
the other hand, the lien of an unrecorded mortgage presumably
'HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1927), p. 680, Sec. 12 (104).
See also 38 H~av.

L. REv. 651, 653 (1925).

"Sec. 8267 by its terms applies to mortgages "made, acknowledged, and
recorded" and specifies that any such mortgage "shall be good as
against all from the time it is so recorded". Sec. 12 (1) of the proposed Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act applies to all mortgages
whether recorded or not.
"Morrison v. Farmers' & Traders State Bank, et al, 70 Mont. 146,
225 Pac. 123 (1924) ; Vitt v. Rogers, 81 Mont. 120, 262 Pac. 164 (1927);
Reed v. Richardson, 94 Mont. 34, 20 P. (2d) 1054 (1933).
"Unless the mortgage is extended under the provisions of R.C.M., 1935,
Se. 8264.
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will continue for an indefinite period. Payments upon or proper acknowledgement of the debt will prevent the statute of limitations running; the debt may remain enforceable for an indefinite period of time and the mortgage lien apparently will be
extended accordingly as against all who are not purchasers for
value and in good faith. The longer a mortgage is kept off the
record, then, the more advantageous the position of the mortgagee, insofar as concerns duration of his lien.
In order to prevent this anomalous situation, the Montana
Court, in the absence of legislative action, would be compelled
to overlook the wording of Sec. 8267, which by its terms applies
only to a recorded mortgage. A proper solution of the problem
is action on the part of the Montana legislature.
William F. Browning.

CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY OF DEEDS DEPENDENT
UPON DEATH OF GRANTOR
In Carnahanv. Gupton,' recently decided by the Montana
Supreme Court, an owner of an undivided one-half interest in
certain land, after executing deeds to his nephew and the latter's wife, placed the deeds in his safety deposit box, to which
he alone had access, in an envelope addressed to the grantees,
and wrote his nephew informing him of these acts and instructing him that the deeds would be delivered to him upon presentation of the letter to the depositary bank after the grantor's
death. The bank had notice of this arrangement. The grantor
continued until his death to farm the land and to render annual
accounts to his co-owner. After the death of the grantor, his
administrator delivered the deeds to the grantees, who recorded
them, but the other heirs brought suit to have them declared invalid. Held, the deeds had not been delivered, were formally
insufficient as a will, and so were without legal effect.
Authorities are agreed that "a grant takes effect, so as to
vest the interest intended to be transferred, only upon its delivery by the grantor."' The concept of delivery, however, is
one of uncertain and varying content. This, of course, is due to
the fact that the term is used, not to indicate a physical act,
but to describe a legal result. While all Courts, including the
Montana court in the principal case, doubtless recognize that
fact, nevertheless much of the confusion in the application of
the concept may be charged to failure of the Courts to make
clear whether it is relinquishment of control over the instrument
or over its legal effect, or both, which they consider essential to
delivery. The usual statement is simply that the grantor must
(2d) R.513
1939).
'96
C. (Mont.
M., 1935;
4 TIFFANY, REAT PROP. (3d Ed.), Sec. 1033.
Sec.P.6843,
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